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INTRODUCTION 
Our society’s relationship with contemporary art is not 
unlike our relationship with mirrors.1  What we see in 
contemporary artworks—like what we see when we look in 
the mirror—may be beautiful, ugly, surprising, or even 
incomprehensible.  Some reflections, like artworks, are 
generally liked or disliked, and some are a matter of personal 
taste.  While we give shape and form to the images we see in 
the mirror, these images, in turn, shape us—although 
perhaps on a deeper level.2 
The essence of contemporary art as an art form is complex 
and multifaceted.3  Some contemporary artworks are more 
aesthetic-oriented, evoking the traditional era of paintings 
made with paint and sculptures hewn from marble.  Others’ 
works push the artistic envelope into the realm of 
commentary, either on social issues or on art itself, using 
unorthodox mediums in surprising ways.4  In this era of 
artistic pluralism,5 art critics and philosophers alike hesitate 
to answer the question “What is art?”;6  some even claim there 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. in Art History, Minor 
in Philosophy, Hamilton College, 2010.  The author would like to thank Professor Gaia 
Bernstein, Professor Charles Sullivan, and the Seton Hall Sports and Entertainment 
Journal members for their insights, expertise, and guidance.  This note is dedicated to 
the author’s father, Richard Ericsson, Esq. 
 1.  See Arthur Danto, The Artworld, J. OF PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 61, No. 19, 571 (Oct. 
15, 1964)(“Hamlet and Socrates, though in praise and deprecation respectively, spoke of 
art as a mirror held up to nature.”); see also OSCAR WILDE, THE DECAY OF LYING, 
reprinted in OSCAR WILDE: COLLECTED WORKS 1134, 1146 (Barnes & Noble Publishing, 
ed., 2006) (“Life imitates art far more than Art imitates life.”). 
 2.  See MARY ANNE STANISZEWSKI, BELIEVING IS SEEING: CREATING THE CULTURE 
OF ART 289 (1995) (“The most important artists of our time are visionary in that they 
continue to challenge us to see our world differently.  They represent our culture in 
enlightened and, at time, beautiful ways.  Artists prepare the mind and the spirit for 
new ideas—new ways of seeing.”). 
 3.  “Contemporary” art is the broad temporal genre encompassing art created in 
the late 20th and early 21st centuries, and the art to come in the future.  Scholars have 
used the label “contemporary” to describe the art of “the present moment” throughout 
the past century, because an era and its art can only be defined retroactively.  See  Dan 
Karlhom, Surveying Contemporary Art: Post-War, Postmodern, And Then What?, 32 
ART HISTORY  712, 716-33 (Sept. 2009). 
 4.  Peter Plagens, How Art Has Changed A Lot, 16 AMERICAN ART 1, 8-10 (Spring 
2008). 
 5.  Karlhom, supra note 3, at 713 (Noting that art historian Eleanor Heartney 
describes this generation of art as an “era of apparently anarchic pluralism”). 
 6.  Plagens, supra note 4. 
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cannot be an answer.7 
The result of art’s struggle with definition, however, is at 
times a terribly difficult and strained reconciliation with the 
clarity desired by United States laws and methods of legal 
application, especially in the area of copyright law.  Granting 
an artwork intellectual property protection is crucial for the 
artist to maintain both economic and cultural standing in 
America’s modern society.  Nevertheless, current 
interpretations of copyright law as applied to contemporary 
works of art may be dictating, and even restricting, the 
artistic “progress” encouraged by our nation’s Constitution.8 
Part I of this Note introduces a recent victim of such 
interpretations: works of art created from organic or natural 
media.  While this growing field of art encompasses many 
sub-genres,9 natural media artworks all share the common 
use of the Earth in their creation.  Part I will sketch a brief 
history of this field and its relevant ancestry, in order to 
explore and understand the aims of natural-media art and of 
contemporary art in general. 
The legal issues addressed in this Note arose in the 
Seventh Circuit case of Kelley v. Chicago Park District,10 
discussed in Part I.  After the park district destroyed 
Wildflower Works, a living version of artist Chapman Kelley’s 
floral paintings, Mr. Kelley was denied moral rights—
delineated by the Visual Artists Rights Act of 199011—to his 
work because the court determined it did not pass the basic 
standard of copyrightability due to its organic flora medium.12  
The court held that a work using natural materials as a 
medium cannot be authored or fixed for purposes of 
 
 7.  See Arthur Danto, From Philosophy to Art Criticism, 16 AMERICAN ART  1, 14, 
15˗ 17 (Spring 2002) (explaining that as far as modes of artistic production are 
concerned, nothing is justifiably preferable to anything else (not ruling out distinctions 
in quality with no objective direction for art to take.). 
 8.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 9.  Sub-categories of natural-media art include, but are not limited to: Earth Art, 
Land Art, Environmental Art, Ecoart, and Bio-art.  See AMY LIPTON AND TRICIA WATTS, 
ECOLOGICAL AESTHETICS, ART IN ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN: THEORY AND PRACTICE, 
Chapter: From Signs to Sculptural Places (2004). 
 10.  Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 11.  17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
 12.  Works must pass a relatively low legal standard to gain copyrightability, 
consisting of physical fixation and a modicum of creativity.  Most works pass these two 
tests with ease.  See Part II, B for further explaination. 
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copyright.13  This decision, recently denied certiorari by the 
Supreme Court,14 is distressing because of the possibly 
damaging legal effects on works which incorporate natural or 
organic media, and on the artists who rely on the copyright 
system for economic and social protection for their works. 
Part II analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s holdings in light of 
the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, the 1976 
Copyright Act, and governing case law.  After considering the 
Seventh Circuit’s rationale for its decision, this Note argues 
that the court incorrectly decided Kelley v. Chicago Park 
District, and suggests an alternative interpretation of the 
governing statute(s) and identifies black-letter law and 
precedential case law in support of this interpretation.  
Furthermore, this Article presents the consequential issues 
this court created by denying basic copyrightability to Mr. 
Kelley’s work. 
Part III concludes this Note with an analysis of the 
broader implication of this decision as an example of the 
problematic judicial activism which often arises in cases 
concerning complex works of contemporary art.  This Note 
argues that it is important for the courts to put aside 
subjective notions of taste, aesthetic preference, and artistic 
judgment if these courts are to apply a proper and objective 
analysis of a work’s copyrightability, and follow both 
statutory and precedential case law.  This Note argues that 
straying from this path of taste neutrality impedes artistic 
development and the cultural and social progress encouraged 
by the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause, and by 
application, leaves many artists without legal paths for relief 
when their livelihoods are compromised. 
I. THE NATURE OF NATURE IN ART: UNDERSTANDING 
ITS PURPOSE AND GOALS 
In the 1960s, the trajectory of the traditional 
institutionalized art common to our Western civilization 
drastically changed direction.  Fueled partly by the notorious 
 
 13.  Kelley, 635 F.3d at 292. 
 14.  Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 380 (2011). 
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“readymades” of Marcel Duchamp,15 and partly by the 
nationwide social upheaval of that era,16 American artists 
funneled their sense of rebellion and skepticism of the 
traditional towards a transcending of art’s status quo.17  The 
result was a post-modern explosion of artistic movements 
founded in the conceptual, including: pop art, minimalism, op 
art, conceptual art, earth art, land art, environmental art, 
body art, and photo-realism, to name only a few.  These 
movements persisted into the 1970s and 1980s, when artists 
continued to expand upon these concepts, often recycling and 
remolding them to better fit the social climate of their own 
decades.18  By the latter half of the 1990s, artists no longer 
felt the need to rebel against art history, and many returned 
to the aesthetic-based techniques of Modernism,19 or at least 
began to include these methods in their conceptual works.20 
In the past decade, after centuries of evolution through 
art’s reflection upon itself, the artistic community has joined 
the rest of the world in its shift towards globalization.21  The 
art of today’s generation focuses on eroding traditional 
conceptual and geographical boundaries by working in a 
broad range of media, including new technologies, 
incorporating more audience involvement and the 
 
 15.  See Marcel Duchamp, Bicycle Wheel (1913) (bicycle wheel mounted upside 
down on a stool); Fountain (1917) (urinal turned on its side atop pedestal).  See also Nat 
Rosenthal, Marcel Duchamp (1887-1968), Heibrunn Timeline of Art History, 
Metropolitan Museum of Art (Sept. 17, 2011) www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/duch/ 
hd_duch.htm.  These “readymades” “challenged the boundaries and even the 
foundations of art as a concept.”  Steven Goldsmith, The Readymades of Marcel 
Duchamp: The Ambiguities of an Aesthetic Revolution, 42 J. OF AESTHETICS AND ART 
CRITICISM 197 (Winter 1983). 
 16.  Rosenthal, supra note 15. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Karlhom, supra note 3 at 720˗ 21. 
 19.  The artistic movement of Modernism is summarized by an attitude of “Art for 
Art’s Sake,” asserting the artist’s privilege to combine whatever elements he pleases for 
aesthetic effect alone.  Artists effectively reversed all the methods devised since the 
Renaissance for transmuting a flat surface into a pictorial space, and instead believed 
“that brush strokes and color patches themselves, not what they stand for, are the 
artist’s primary reality.”  See H.W. JANSON & DORA JANE JANSON, HISTORY OF ART: A 
SURVEY OF THE MAJOR VISUAL ARTS FROM THE DAWN OF HISTORY TO THE PRESENT DAY 
492˗ 93 (18th ed., 1974). 
 20.  Karlhom, supra note 3 at 726. 
 21.  Id. at 729. 
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presentation of bigger spectacles.22  These contemporary 
artists “are connected to something greater than themselves 
and art: the world, the human spirit, democracy, or the 
universe.”23  In particular, our society’s fixation on the current 
state of the relationship between humans and the 
environment inspires many artists to attempt to draw the 
fast-paced, industry-driven, technology-obsessed American 
back to nature by utilizing organic materials in their works.  
Today, our fascination with sustainability and “green living” 
is reflected not just in the food we eat or the cars we drive, but 
also in our art.  This art ranges from the purely aesthetic to 
message-laden metaphors, using the Earth’s bounty as a 
medium for their expressions.24 
II. KELLEY V. CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT 
A. An Artist’s Fight 
Chapman Kelley is a nationally recognized artist, 
traditionally known for his representational paintings of 
landscapes and flora—specifically, romantic flora and 
woodland paintings set within ellipses.25  In the past sixty 
years, the Texas native has received many prestigious awards 
for his paintings and has participated in multiple major 
exhibitions throughout the country.26 
In 1984, Mr. Kelley decided to take his artwork beyond the 
canvas and actualize his wildflower ellipses.27  He received 
 
 22.  See STANISZEWSKI, supra note 2, at 255-301 (examples of this new generation 
of artworks). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Examples of these works include: Vaughn Bell’s Personal Forest Floor 
(Portable Mountain) (2003-08), small organic landscapes on wheels meant to be tended 
to and walked around like pets, and Village Green (2008), suspended personal and 
portable biospheres.  Rachel Wolff, “Turning Over a New Leaf,” ARTnews (April 2009) 
http://www.artnews.com/2009/04/01/turning-over-a-new-leaf/; see also T. Allen Comp’s 
The Litmus Garden (2001), a collection of native trees and shrubs planted alongside a 
six-pond color-changing water treatment system.  T. Allan Comp, Litmus Garden, 
GREEN MUSEUM, http://greenmuseum.org/content/artist_content/ct_id-14__artist_id-
15.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2013). 
 25.  Kelley, 635 F.3d at 291, 293. 
 26.  Chapman Kelley Biography, CHAPMANKELLEY.COM (Oct. 22, 2011), 
http://chapmankelley.com/3/Asset.asp?AssetID=6098&AKey=JLBDK6W2. 
 27.  Wildflowers as Art in a Chicago Park, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1985, 
www.nytimes.com/1985/06/20/garden/wildflowers-as-art-in-a-chicago-park.html. 
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permission from the Chicago Park District to install two oval 
flower beds the size of football fields in Grant Park along the 
city’s lakefront.28  Mr. Kelley installed—and personally 
financed—between 48 and 60 species of wildflowers native to 
the Chicago region with help from his own team of 
volunteers.29  The flowers were selected solely by Mr. Kelley, 
and planted so that they would blossom sequentially, with 
colors changing throughout the season and increasing in 
brightness towards the center of each ellipse.30  The work was 
entitled Chicago Wildflower Work I (hereinafter Wildflower 
Works). 
In addition to the aesthetic design, this real-life “painting” 
was also a test of “the economic and ecological impact of 
introducing wildflowers into cities,” including possibilities of 
erosion control, reductions in water consumption and mowing, 
and gas, manpower, and pollution reduction.31  The work, 
promoted as “living art,” was a great success with the public 
and with state politicians.32 
Wildflower Works was maintained by Mr. Kelley and his 
volunteers until 2004, when park officials wished to 
reconfigure Wildflower Works to accommodate new 
construction in the park.33  When notified of the 
reconfiguration, Mr. Kelley refused to approve the changes; 
the park officials nevertheless moved forward with the 
reconfiguration a week later.  Wildflower Works was reduced 
in size by half and the remaining wildflowers were moved into 
smaller rectangular beds along with new plantings.34 
Shortly afterward, Mr. Kelley sued the Chicago Park 
District on the basis that the reconfiguration of Wildflower 
Works violated his moral rights under the Visual Artists 
Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”).35  Mr. Kelley claimed that the 
 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Kelley, 635 F.3d at 293. 
 30.  Id. at 293. 
 31.  Wildflowers as Art in a Chicago Park, supra note 27. 
 32.  Kelley, 635 F.3d at 292; see also Wildflowers as Art in a Chicago Park, supra 
note 27(the chief horticulturalist for the Chicago Park District quoted as stating that 
“Wildflower Works” is “unique in scope and size, and for its contrast and color.”). 
 33.  Kelley, 635 F.3d at 294. 
 34.  Id. 
 35. Kelley, 635 F.3d.at 295.  The Visual Arts Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A, stems 
from the French Droit moral, which “arise[s] from the belief that an artist, in the 
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reconfiguration was an intentional “distortion, mutilation, or 
other modification” of his work, and was “prejudicial to his … 
honor [and] reputation.”36 
In 2008, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois held for the Park District, finding that, 
even though Kelley’s work could fit the definition of a 
painting or sculpture required for moral rights protection 
under VARA, Wildflower Works lacked the basic copyright 
requisites of original authorship and fixation.  Thus, VARA 
protection could not be applied because the work was 
inherently uncopyrightable.37  Kelley subsequently appealed 
this decision to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
which affirmed the district court’s holding in January 2011.38 
B. The Copyright Standard 
While the Seventh Circuit Court rejected the district 
court’s holding that Wildflower Works could be considered a 
work of visual art under VARA,39 the circuit court did agree 
that the work did not meet the basic copyrightability 
standards of original authorship and fixation required for 
VARA qualification.40 
Copyright protection is rooted in Article I, § 8, clause 8 of 
the United States Constitution, which delegates to Congress 
 
process of creation, injects some of his spirit into the art and that, consequently, the 
artist’s personality, as well as the integrity of the work, should be protected and 
preserved.”  2 RALPH E. LERNER AND JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW 1252, (3d ed. 2005).  
VARA grants artists the right “to prevent any destruction, distortion, mutilation, or 
other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or 
reputation, and which is the result of an intentional or negligent act or omission with 
respect to that work.”  17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3) (2012).  However, this protection is 
limited to the following works of visual art: “a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, 
existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer … or a still 
photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  
Furthermore, a work of visual art does not include “any work not subject to copyright 
protection under this title.” 
 36.  Kelley, 635 F.3d at 295. 
 37.  Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 04C07715, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75791 *17-18 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2008). 
 38.  Kelley, 635 F.3d at 308. 
 39.  Id. at 300 (holding that for a work to receive VARA protection, “it cannot just 
be ‘pictorial’ or ‘sculptural’ in some aspect or effect, it must actually be a ‘painting’ or a 
‘sculpture.’  Not metaphorically or by analogy, but really”) (emphasis in original). 
 40.  Id. at 305-6. 
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the power “to Promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”41  Known as the Intellectual Property Clause, it 
provides an economic incentive for artists to create art by 
awarding them the right to profit from their creation for a 
specific amount of time, in return for their eventual 
contribution to the public and towards the “progress” fostered 
by the Constitution.42 
The most recent codification of the Intellectual Property 
Clause is the Copyright Act of 197643 (“the Act”), which limits 
copyright protection to “original works of authorship fixed in 
any tangible medium44 of expressionFalse”45  Furthermore, 
when the work at issue is a compilation of preexisting 
elements with a different end result (as seen in Wildflower 
Works), the copyright in the work “extends only to the 
material contributed by the author of such work False”46 
 
 41.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 42.  LEONARD D. DUBOFF & CHRISTY O. KING, ART LAW (IN A NUTSHELL) 158 (3d 
ed. 2000). 
 43.  17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 44.  The medium in which a work is executed does not affect its copyrightability, so 
long as the work complies with the other requirements.  See DuBoff & King, supra note 
42 at 167. 
 45.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Subject matter of copyright: In general: (a) 
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, 
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.  Works of authorship include the 
following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying 
words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and 
choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures 
and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.”)  
(Emphasis added).  Additionally,  17 U.S.C. § 102(b) clarifies that copyright protection 
does not extend to “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery False”  See also H.R. REP NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976) (explaining  
the narrow language change from that used the Intellectual Property Clause to what is 
used in the Copyright Act, stating: “In using the phrase “original works of authorship,” 
rather than “all the writings of an author” . . ., the committee’s purpose is to avoid 
exhausting the constitutional power of Congress to legislate in this field, and to 
eliminate the uncertainties arising from the latter phrase.”). 
 46.  17 U.S.C.A § 103(b).  “The copyright in a compilation or derivative work 
extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished 
from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive 
right in the preexisting material.  The copyright in such work is independent of, and 
does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any 
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C. The Seventh Circuit’s Analysis and Holding 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit saw Mr. 
Kelley’s work of art as nothing more than a living garden, 
which, it claimed, inherently lacked the kind of authorship 
and stable fixation explicitly required by the Intellectual 
Property Clause to support copyright.47  Because works must 
be the original product of a human author in order to be 
copyrightable, the court held that Wildflower Works could not 
be copyrighted because “gardens are planted and cultivated, 
not authored.”48  While the court found Wildflower Works to 
possess the requisite level of originality for copyright,49 the 
court rejected the argument that Mr. Kelley’s design was an 
act of authorship, asserting that “[t]o the extent that seeds or 
seedlings can be considered a ‘medium of expression,’ they 
originate in nature, and natural forces—not the intellect of 
the gardener—determine their form, growth, and 
appearance.”50 
Furthermore, the court did not find the work to be “fixed,” 
holding that “a garden is simply too changeable to satisfy the 
primary purpose of fixation51 False  It may endure from 
season to season, but its nature is one of dynamic change.”52  
The court was also troubled by its inability to determine what 
the baseline for fixation and copyright infringement may be 
for a variable work such as Wildflower Works, for without a 
sufficiently permanent and stable copy of the designer’s 
intellectual expression, the work is not as easily susceptible to 
infringing copying and as such does not require copyright 
protection.53 
 
copyright protection in the preexisting material.” 
 47. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 303 (7th Cir. 2011), 
 48.  Id. at 304; see also Id. (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM II: 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 503.03(a) (1984): “‘[A] work must be the product of 
human authorship’ and not the forces of nature.”). 
 49. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 303. 
 50.  Id. at 304. 
 51.  “Fixation serves two basic roles: (1) easing problems of proof or creation and 
infringement, and (2) providing the dividing line between state common law protection 
and protection under the federal Copyright Act, since works that are not fixed are 
ineligible for federal protection but may be protected under state law.”  Id., quoting 2 
WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT , § 3:22 (Year) . 
 52.  Kelley, 635 F.3d at 304-05. 
 53.  Id. at 305. 
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The court did attempt to clarify its holding, maintaining 
that it was “not suggesting that copyright attaches only to 
works that are static or fully permanent (no medium of 
expression lasts forever), or that artists who incorporate 
natural or living elements in their work can never claim 
copyright.”54  Following this analysis, the court would find 
copyrightability in other variable works, such as Alexander 
Calder’s wind-activated mobiles, and even works created 
using natural materials, such as Jeff Koons’ oversized floral 
topiary Puppy.55  Because the court found Wildflower Works to 
be neither authored nor fixed in the sense required for basic 
copyright under the Act, it determined that Wildflower Works 
did not qualify for moral-rights protection under VARA.56  The 
Seventh Circuit court remanded to the district court with 
instructions to enter judgment for the Chicago Park District.57 
Following this holding, on July 18, 2011, Mr. Kelley filed a 
petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court, asking the Court to determine “[w]hether an original 
work of art that incorporates living elements is ‘unauthored’ 
and thus not protected under the Copyright Act,” and 
“[w]hether an original work of art that incorporates living 
elements can be ‘fixed’ for the purposes of protection under 
the Copyright Act.”58  While American artists and their 
advocates urged the court, in amici briefs,59 to open[] the door 
to protecting artists’ rights,” these efforts were unsuccessful.60  
The petition was denied by the Supreme Court on October 3, 
2011.61 
 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at 305-06. 
 56.  Id. at 306. 
 57.  Id. at 308. 
 58.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 132 S. Ct. 380 
(2011) (No. 11-101). 
 59.  Brief for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011) (No. 11-101); Brief for The 
Intellectual Property Law Assoc. of Chicago as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011) (No. 11-101), . 
 60.  Peter Simek, Dallas Artist Chapman Kelley Takes Wildflower Case to Supreme 
Court, DALLAS MAGAZINE (July 26, 2011, 8:50 AM), http://frontrow.dmagazine.com/ 
2011/07/dallas-artist-chapman-kelley-takes-wildflower-case-to-supreme-court/. 
 61.  Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
380 (2011). 
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D. Kelley’s Effect on Contemporary American Art and Artists 
With the denial of Mr. Kelley’s petition for writ of 
certiorari, the Seventh Circuit’s ruling on copyrightability for 
works which incorporate natural materials stands as the 
leading decision on the issue.  The impact of this holding on 
American visual artists is significant; following Kelley, works 
of art employing natural media run a grave risk of being 
deemed uncopyrightable.62  As a result, many artists may find 
themselves unable to protect both their economic rights under 
the Act and their moral rights under VARA, leaving their art 
and their well-being as artists without legal protection. 
Art enthusiasts argue that the court’s muddled analysis of 
the authorship and fixation elements “has opened up a 
Pandora’s box of copyright issues for a vast spectrum of 
artwork incorporating natural elements;” and that the court’s 
degradation of Mr. Kelley’s artistic and intellectual efforts to 
the labor of a gardener “greatly undermine[s] the domains of 
land art, bio-art and any other artwork involving the medium 
of nature.”63  Since the court cites Wildflower Works’ vitality 
as one reason for its uncopyrightability, the opinion leaves in 
limbo artworks that use lifeless materials which originated in 
nature, such as Damien Hirst’s famed tiger shark suspended 
in a tank of formaldehyde, and those works which are part 
nature, part man-made, such as the 7,000 oak tree and stone 
column pairs Joseph Beuys placed throughout New York 
City.64 
The Seventh Circuit’s self-comforting rationale that “the 
law must have some limits”65 is viewed as the “kiss of death to 
conceptual art” and detrimental to artists’ rights.66  Art 
advocates warn that the Seventh Circuit’s ruling not only 
“‘create[s] an adverse precedent for US artists who use 
organic material to make their art,’ impacting not just Kelley 
 
 62.  Chin-Chin Yap, The Un-Edenic State of Copyright, ARTASIAPACIFIC (May/June 
2011), http://artasiapacific.com/Magazine/73/TheUnEdenicStateOfCopyright. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. (discussing Damien Hirst’s The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind 
of Someone Living (1991) and Joseph Beuys’ 7,000 Oaks (1982-87)). 
 65.  Kelley, 635 F.3d at 304. 
 66.  Sergio Muñoz Sarmiento, Court: Not All Conceptual Art May Be Copyrighted, 
CLANCCO  (Feb. 16, 2011),  http://clancco.com/wp/2011/02/vara_moral-
rights_sculpture_originality/. 
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but also ‘the broader US arts community and the rights of 
painters and sculptors,’”67 but also “challenge[s] and harm[s] 
the ability to advise and educate artists in the area of 
copyright law, especially with regard to works of art 
incorporating living materials and other innovative 
materials.”68  Such an undesirable use of American copyright 
law carries on the practice of judicial misunderstanding 
towards the arts community in the United States.69 
III. QUESTIONING THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION 
The art community’s concern that the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision will significantly hinder future artistic and 
intellectual advancement if other courts follow in its footsteps 
demands a detailed assessment of the court’s analysis.70  
Below is an examination of what is required of a work to be 
eligible for copyrightability, paralleled with the Seventh 
Circuit’s own interpretation of the § 102(a) requirements.  
Specifically, we must delve deeper into the two operative 
holdings of the Seventh Circuit’s ruling: (1) that using 
materials found in nature in one’s artwork is the “wrong kind” 
of authorship for copyright protection, as these materials owe 
their appearance to nature, not the author; and (2) that using 
living materials in an artwork precludes fixation for purposes 
of copyright despite the work’s otherwise tangible and 
perceivable form.71 
A. Original Work of the “Wrong Kind” of Authorship: 
Untangling the Seventh Circuit’s Oxymoron 
1. Clarifying the Language 
In order to sustain the utilitarian give and take of 
 
 67.  Martha Lufkin, Chicago court denies artist’s copyright appeal, THE ART 
NEWSPAPER (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/ 
Chicago+court+denies+artist’s+copyright+appeal/23575. 
 68.  See Brief for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011) (No. 11-101). 
 69.  Simek, supra note 60. 
 70.  Advocacy, VOLUNTEER LAWYERS FOR THE ARTS, www.vlany.org/advocacy/ 
index.php (last visited Oct. 25, 2011). 
 71.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 58, at 1. 
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protection and progress embodied in the Intellectual Property 
Clause, § 102(a) of the Act requires that a work must be an 
“original work of authorship” in order to be awarded copyright 
protection.72  The 1976 Act does not define the terms within 
this requirement.  Instead, Congress deferred to case law 
under the previous 1909 Act for its desired interpretation of 
the standard.73  While the 1909 Act did not expressly require 
originality, the courts uniformly inferred the requirement 
from the fact that only “authors” could claim copyright 
protection for their works.74  The term “author” was defined as 
“‘the beginner … or first mover of anything ... creator, 
originator.’”75  Today, the “author” is more specifically 
recognized as the intellect behind the matter—the person who 
conceptualizes and directs the development of the work’s form 
and content rather than the person who simply follows orders 
to physically execute the work.76 
These definitions suggest that the terms “authorship” and 
“originality” are mutually exclusive—a work is not the 
product of an author unless the work is original.77  It follows 
that we must also determine the intended meaning of 
“originality” for copyright purposes.  While the term might 
seem to imply the need for a new and unique work as a whole, 
in application it only calls for independent creation by a 
person as an expression of one’s imaginative spark or minimal 
degree of creativity—not novelty.78  Therefore, “a work will 
not be denied copyright protection simply because it is 
substantially similar to a work previously produced by others, 
and hence, is not novel.”79  The terms “original” and “author” 
 
 72.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 73.  See 1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01 
(2011) (hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT) (quoting H.R. REP NO. 94-1476, at 51: “The 
phrase ‘original works or authorship,’ which is purposely left undefined, is intended to 
incorporate without change the standard of originality established by the courts under 
the present [1909] copyright statute.”) 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. (quoting Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co. of Neb., 58 F. Supp. 
523, 531 (D. Neb. 1944)). 
 76.  Jane C. Ginsberg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 
52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1072 (2003). 
 77.  1-2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01. 
 78.  See infra note 84 for a compiled list of relevant sources for this definition. 
 79.  1-2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01 at [A] (explaining that “novelty” is a 
requirement reserved for patent law, and should not be confused with copyright’s 
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signify codependent, almost identical, requirements for 
copyright: when a work is independently created—not copied 
from other works—it is original, and an original work’s 
creator must be an author.80 
The Supreme Court took pains to highlight this inherent 
interconnectedness in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony.81  In determining original authorship of a photograph, 
the Court looked for the imprint of the author in the subject’s 
pose, expression, costume, and accessories, and in the 
photograph’s arrangement of light and shadow on both the 
subject and the background.82  Because these visible elements 
owed their origin to the author of the photograph, the court 
found originality for copyright purposes.83  This 
understanding of originality and authorship is not only 
dictated by the Supreme Court,84 but is also accepted by 
almost every federal circuit—including the Seventh85—and is 
 
“originality” requirement). 
 80.  Id. (“Originality in the copyright sense means only that the work owes its 
origin to the author, i.e., is independently created.”). 
 81.  Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
 82.  Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the 
Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 390 (2004). 
 83.  Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58 (indicating that writings as indicated in the 
Intellectual Property Clause include all forms of visible expression of the author’s 
ideas). 
 84.  See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954) (original pieces of art are tangible 
expressions of an artist’s ideas); Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
348 (1991) (requiring only a minimal degree of creativity in original works). 
 85.  See Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1112 (1st Cir. 
1993) (describing “original elements” as those that were “contributed by the author”); 
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1921) (“‘Original’ 
in reference to a copyrighted work means that the particular work ‘owes its origin’ to 
the ‘author.’”); Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199, 207 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(finding that the addition of the artist’s own imaginative spark is enough to denote 
originality, and therefore copyrightability.); Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 
329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that this definition is appropriate because 
“any more demanding requirement would be burdensome to enforce and would involve 
judges in making aesthetic judgments, which few judges are competent to make.”); Toro 
Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986) (“Originality denotes only 
enough definite expression so that one may distinguish authorship.”); Satava v. Lowry, 
323 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 2003); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 
823, 837 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Originality in the field of copyright requires that the work be 
independently created by the author and that it poses a minimal degree of creativity.”); 
Warren Publ’g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1523 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(“What does originality mean? The selection must be made independently by the 
compiler not copied, and must owe its origin to the author.”). 
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thus, without question, dispositive on both the Seventh 
Circuit and our investigation here. 
For compilation works, such as Wildflower Works, 
copyright protection requires an additional step: an analysis 
of the work’s specific identifiable components to determine the 
scope of the work’s protection. While a work as a whole may 
be original enough to receive copyright protection, specific 
components within the work may not qualify as “original” and 
“authored,” and therefore the artist cannot receive piecemeal 
copyright protection for those components.86 Interpretation of 
this requirement for copyright universally follows the 
Supreme Court’s holding in the seminal case of Feist 
Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co,87  which held 
that even if facts are not copyrightable because they do not 
owe their origin to an act of authorship,88 compilations of facts 
may receive copyright protection if the compilation is 
sufficiently original.89 
Once again, while the originality factor is the sine qua non 
of copyright, the requisite level of originality in a compilation 
is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.90  As long 
as the choices of selection and arrangement “are made 
independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of 
 
 86.  See Bucklew, 329 F.3d at 929 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating “[e]very expressive work 
can be decomposed into elements not themselves copyrightable False  The presence of 
such elements obviously does not forfeit copyright protection of the work as a whole . . .; 
it is the combination of elements, or particular novel twists given to them, that supply 
the minimal originality required for copyright protection.”  Note that this decision is 
dispositive precedent for Kelley). 
 87.  Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).  In this case, the 
court held that alphabetical listings of names, accompanied by towns and phone 
numbers, in a telephone book’s white pages were not copyrightable because the listings 
were uncopyrightable facts, and the telephone company did not select, coordinate, or 
arrange these uncopyrightable facts in an original way sufficient to satisfy the 
minimum standards for copyright protection. 
 88. “The most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that ‘no author may copyright 
his ideas or the facts he narrates.’”  Id. at 344-45 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)). 
 89. Id. at 344.  The Court followed the definition of “compilation” as found in § 101 
of the Copyright Act: “a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting 
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the 
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.”  Id. at 356 
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (emphasis in original)); see also 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) 
(1988) (“copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material 
contributed by the author of such work”). 
 90. Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 345. 
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creativity, [the compilation is] sufficiently original that 
Congress may protect such compilations through the 
copyright laws.”91  Again, such copyright protection is limited 
only to the elements of the work that are original to the 
author.92 
Like compilation works containing facts, those works 
which utilize elements found in nature, such as Wildflower 
Works, must also undergo analytical scrutiny to separate the 
authored elements from the uncopyrightable in order to 
determine the scope of copyright protection.  The United 
States Copyright Office dictates that a work “must owe its 
origin to a human being.  Materials produced solely by 
nature, by plants, or by animals are not copyrightable.”93  
Examples of such uncopyrightable works include those 
produced by mechanical process or random selection without 
any contribution by a human author, such as a multi-colored 
pebble design on a linoleum floor, and those owing their forms 
exclusively to the forces of nature, such as a polished and 
mounted piece of driftwood.94 
2. The Mistake 
In determining that Wildflower Works was created by the 
“wrong kind” of author, the Seventh Circuit strayed from both 
the Supreme Court’s binding precedent in Feist and the 
accepted interpretation of this requirement in the Copyright 
Act, and contradicted rulings on compilation works by 
multiple circuits, including the Seventh itself.95  While the 
court was given the difficult task of understanding and 
deconstructing a nonconventional conceptual work of art, this 
difficulty does not justify its erroneous analysis of the law.  
 
 91. Id. at 348.  The Court later clarified “that the selection and arrangement of 
facts cannot be so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever.”  Id. at 
362. 
 92. Id. at 348 (1991); see also 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (“copyright in a compilation or 
derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as 
distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply 
any exclusive right in the preexisting material”). 
 93. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM II: COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 
202.02(b) (1984). 
 94.  2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3.19, n.1 (2011) (hereinafter 
“PATRY ON COPYRIGHT”). 
 95.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 58, at 1. 
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The following paragraphs explain why the Seventh Circuit’s 
application of the original authorship requirement is flawed 
and how this application threatens the scope of copyright as 
envisioned by the Constitution. 
First, it is clear that Wildflower Works is both original and 
authored as defined by the statutory interpretation and 
legislative history of § 102(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act.96  In 
Kelley, the Seventh Circuit conceded the inherent 
interconnectedness of the statute’s relevant terms,97 yet failed 
to apply this theory in its analysis.  The court first 
appropriately rebuked the district court’s holding that the 
work was not original because it was not novel.98  It was plain 
to the Seventh Circuit that Wildflower Works was not copied 
and possessed more than a little creative spark,99 although 
the court did not elaborate on how it came to this conclusion. 
The facts of the case show that Wildflower Works was 
independently created by its author, using more than a 
minimal degree of creativity.100  As a work which clearly 
utilizes uncopyrightable materials to create the work as a 
whole, we must look to the rules for compilation works 
outlined in Feist and § 103 of the Act and separate the 
uncopyrightable elements created by nature from the rest of 
the work.101  While the individual wildflowers themselves are 
not original to Mr. Kelley, the selection, coordination, and 
arrangement of the flowers are completely original to him.102  
Mr. Kelley was the sole mind behind the concept and 
development of the artwork.103  Furthermore, witnesses of the 
artwork state that it was “unique in scope and size, and for its 
contrast and color.”104  This is more than enough to 
 
 96.  See Yap, supra note 62. 
 97.  Kelley, 635 F.3d at 303 (quoting 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:20: “[w]ritings are 
what authors create, but for one to be an author, the writing has to be original”). 
 98.  Kelley, 635 F.3d at 302-03 (stating that the district court’s analysis 
“mistakenly equates originality with novelty; the law is clear that a work can be 
original even if it is not novel”). 
 99.  Kelley, 635 F.3d at 303. 
 100.  And thus fulfilling the elements required for “originality.” 
 101.  Feist, 499 U.S. at 348; 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). 
 102.  This is analogous to the photograph in Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 55: the 
photographer’s copyright lay in the selection, coordination, and arrangement of the 
elements within the photograph. 
 103.  Kelley, 635 F.3d at 291-93. 
 104.  See supra note 33. 
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substantiate a finding of originality in Wildflower Works for 
the purposes of copyright. 
After discussing originality, however, the Seventh Circuit 
took a questionable turn in holding that, despite its 
originality, Wildflower Works lacks the requisite “authorship” 
needed to establish basic copyrightability.105  As a work which 
utilizes uncopyrightable materials, protection will depend on 
the authorship of the selection, coordination, and 
arrangement of the materials.106  If the artist’s variations of 
these elements are original, they may earn copyright 
protection.107  Following Supreme Court precedent,108 these 
elements were original to Mr. Kelley, and as such were per se 
“authored” by Mr. Kelley, and thus Wildflower Works is an 
“original work of authorship.” 
Yet, in its analysis of the work’s “authorship,” the Seventh 
Circuit ignored both precedent to determine original 
authorship as well as its own reasons for finding originality in 
Wildflower Works in the first place.  The court did recognize 
that Mr. Kelley specifically chose each wildflower according to 
his concept and deliberately arranged and planted them in a 
unique sculptural format.109  However, in its analysis of 
“authorship,” the court mistakenly focused on the natural 
materials used in the work and the overall creation’s basic 
resemblance to a flower garden: “[s]imply put, gardens are 
planted and cultivated, not authored.”110  According to the 
court, Wildflower Works is just a garden, nothing more.111  
The court’s decision turns on the authorship of the work’s 
primary medium.  The floral components of this compilation 
inarguably owe their individual form and appearance to 
natural forces;112 however, the selection, coordination, and 
arrangement of the flowers were not results of nature, and 
may be considered the product of an author if they are 
 
 105.  Kelley, 635 F.3d at 303-04. 
 106.  1-3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.04(b)(2); See also Feist, 499 U.S. at 351. 
 107.  Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 108.  See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
 109.  Brief for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 6, n. 3, Kelley, 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011) (No. 11-101) (citing Kelley, 635 F.3d at 
293). 
 110.  Id. at 304. 
 111.  Id. at 306. 
 112.  Id. at 304. 
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original.113  The court disregarded this second step, dictated 
by the Supreme Court in Feist, and, in confusing the concepts 
of artistic materials with artistic works, stopped short of 
considering the elements beyond the individual flowers which 
make Wildflower Works an original work. 
The Seventh Circuit’s holding on authorship as dictated by 
the author of the medium is also clearly inconsistent with 
already-copyrighted works that use materials found in 
nature.114  For example, the Copyright Office has granted 
numerous copyright registrations to the floral and fruit 
sculptures created by the well-known food retailer Edible 
Arrangements, and also to the American Sand Art 
Corporation for its sand sculptures.115  Even though the 
mediums of fruit and sand are authored solely by nature, the 
authorship requirement for copyright is not concerned with 
the medium of the work, and so these original sculptures 
authored by humans can be granted copyright protection. 
B. Stretching the Language of Fixation 
1. Clarifying the Language 
The second requirement for basic copyright, fixation of the 
work, is Congress’s method of ensuring that in exchange for 
copyright protection, the work can be later made available for 
others to copy in the public domain.116  A “fixed” work is 
crucial to the “deal” between society and the author of a work; 
without fixation, the author deposits nothing into the public 
domain.117  It also guarantees that only the expression of the 
idea is protected, rather than the idea itself, and thus 
 
 113.  See Feist, 499 U.S. at 351. 
 114.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 58, at 20-21. 
 115.  Id. (referring to Edible Arrangements’ “Berry Bouquet,” Reg. No. 
VA0001021475; “Blooming daisies,” Reg. No. VA0001021473; “Delicious celebration,” 
Reg. No. VA0001021474; “Delicious fruit design,” Reg. No. VA0001021472; and “Hearts 
and berries,” Reg. No. VA0001021476, and to American Sand Art Corporation’s “Large 
flamingo,” Reg. No. VA0000603490; “Macaw parrot,” Reg. No. VA0000603407; and 
“Extra large castle,” Reg. No. VA0000603493). 
 116.  Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1151, 1195-96 (2007). 
 117.  Joseph C. Merschman, Anchoring Copyright Laws in the Copyright Clause: 
Halting the Commerce Clause End Run Around Limits on Congress’s Copyright Power, 
34 CONN. L. REV. 661, 681 (2002). 
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preserves the idea/expression dichotomy of the copyright 
system.118  This necessary separation of ideas from 
expressions owes its origin to the “Writings” created by 
“Authors” as stated in the Intellectual Property Clause.119  As 
codified, § 102(a) of the Copyright Act dictates that a work be 
fixed in a “tangible medium of expression.”  The fixation is 
sufficient if the work “can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device.”120 
The accompanying House Report explains that the reason 
for the sufficiency standard is “to avoid the artificial and 
largely unjustifiable distinctions ... under which statutory 
copyrightability in certain cases has been made to depend 
upon the form or medium in which the work is fixed.”121  
These “certain cases” referred to by Congress are those live 
audible transmissions—such as music performances, sports 
broadcasts, and news coverage—that reach the public in 
unfixed form but can be simultaneously recorded.122  The 
relevant case law also supports a broad interpretation of what 
may qualify as a “fixed” work.  In Goldstein v. California, the 
Supreme Court held that “writings … may be interpreted to 
include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative 
intellectual or aesthetic labor.”123  Overall, both Congress and 
the courts highlight the broad interpretation of fixation, 
allowing, for the most part, a “material object” enough of a 
vehicle for the fixation requirement.124 
The fixation requirement withholds from copyrightability 
those works that are not “sufficiently permanent or stable to 
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a 
period of more than transitory duration.”125  Examples of 
these include “those [works] projected briefly on a screen, 
 
 118.  Id. at 683 (referring to § 102(b) of the Copyright Act). 
 119.  U.S. CONST. amend. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 120.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 121.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 52. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).  See also Burrow-Giles, 111 
U.S. at 58, stating that “Writings” includes all ways “by which the ideas of the mind of 
the author are given visible expression.” 
 124.  London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 171 n. 23 (D. Mass. 
2008) (discussing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 52). 
 125.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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shown electronically on a television or other cathode ray tube, 
or captured momentarily in the ‘memory’ of a computer.”126 
2. Fixation of “Wildflower Works” 
The Seventh Circuit held that Wildflower Works was not 
“fixed” for copyright purposes because of the work’s 
“changeable” nature, that “its appearance is too inherently 
variable to supply a baseline for determining questions of 
copyright creation and infringement.”127  The court’s 
assessment, however, does not follow the test for fixation 
presented in plain language in § 102(a).128  In fact, the court’s 
reasoning behind its decision is unmistakably at odds with 
both Congress’s statutory interpretation in the accompanying 
House Report, and with the relevant case law on this issue. 
For Wildflower Works to be recognized as “fixed,” it must 
be (1) a tangible medium of expression, and (2) must be 
permanent or stable enough to be perceived by an audience 
for longer than a transitory duration.129  The Seventh Circuit 
conceded that Wildflower Works is both tangible and can be 
perceived for more than a transitory duration, and so the 
question of whether Wildflower Works meets the element of 
“fixation” should have ended there.130  Instead, the court 
continued to reason that the work’s essence of dynamic and 
perpetual change dictates that it is not stable or permanent 
enough to be called “fixed.”131  This last inquiry is neither 
required by the Copyright Act nor relevant to determine 
“fixation” for copyright purposes.  The court’s argument that 
the essence of change embodied in Wildflower Works as a 
garden precludes copyrightability is on its face insignificant.  
Establishing “fixation” is not a matter of a work’s essence, but 
rather of its ability to express the author’s idea for more than 
a transitory duration.  In addition, the court’s argument is 
focused on the medium of the work rather than the overall 
expression of the work.132  As it did with “authorship,” the 
 
 126.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 53. 
 127.  Kelley, 635 F.3d at 304-305. 
 128.  See supra note 46, for the test delineated in § 102(a) of the Copyright Act. 
 129.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 130.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 58, at 22. 
 131.  Kelley, 635 F.3d at 305. 
 132.  See supra note 45. 
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court once again ignored the analytical path mandated by the 
Copyright Act, and instead devised a new test for basic 
copyrightability.133 
The majority opinion in Kelley is also internally 
inconsistent in its analysis of fixation.  While the court held 
firm to its impression that a medium subject to change within 
a work defeats the work’s potential copyrightability, it later 
states that it is “not suggesting that copyright attaches only 
to works that are static or fully permanent (no medium of 
expression lasts forever), or that artists who incorporate 
natural or living elements in their work can never claim 
copyright.”134  Despite its attempt to redeem itself from its 
disconcerting holding, the Seventh Circuit’s failure to provide 
examples of what it was “suggesting” brings us one step 
forward and two steps back. 
The Seventh Circuit’s holding on “fixation” is especially 
counter-intuitive when we consider the copyrightability of the 
examples discussed in the opinion in juxtaposition to the 
court’s standard.  One example discussed by the court is an 
artwork entitled Puppy by the popular contemporary 
American artist Jeff Koons.135  This work, exhibited 
worldwide, is a model of a puppy almost three stories high – 
and made using a metal frame, soil, geotextile fabric, an 
internal irrigation system, and live flowering plants.136  In 
fact, at each exhibition the blooms on Puppy are noticeably 
different in color, pattern, and growth. While this work 
includes the same kinds of organic materials as Wildflower 
Works and the same changeable nature, the Seventh Circuit 
posited—without any explanation—that Puppy is likely to be 
considered “fixed” and thus copyrightable.137  This is a glaring 
contradiction, as in its opinion the court had just previously 
declared that, because the “essence” of living flowers is to 
change, works using them as a medium are ineligible for 
protection.138 
 
 133.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 58, at 22. 
 134.  Kelley, 635 F.3d at 305. 
 135.  Kelley 635 F.3d at 305-06. 
 136.  Jeff Koons, jeffkoons.com/site/index/html (follow “Puppy” hyperlink). 
 137.  Kelley, 635 F.3d at 306. 
 138.  Brief for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 11, Kelley, 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011) (No. 11-101). 
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Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit’s standard for fixation 
cannot be reconciled with types of works which are granted 
copyright protection directly by the language of the statue.  
Choreography,139 though fixed only in the fleeting movements 
of a dancer, is copyrightable so long as there is a written 
explanation of the steps, or a taped recording; it can be 
protected even from infringers looking to copy the 
choreography from a live stage performance instead of from 
the written description of the steps.140  Certainly this does not 
comply with the Seventh Circuit’s denial of copyright 
protection for works with an “essence” of “vitality,” yet it is 
enough for the guidelines set by the Copyright Act.141 
C. Problematic Results 
The Seventh Circuit’s dual holding on authorship and 
fixation presents two problems.  First, the standard creates a 
bar against granting copyright protection to any work made of 
a natural or living medium – a drastic blow to the art 
community.  Such a disservice to innovative contemporary 
artists will significantly hinder development in ground-
breaking fields such as bio-art and eco-art, as well as in more 
traditional art forms that use natural materials.142  Without 
the possibility of copyright protection, artists who work in 
these fields will be less likely to take artistic risks, thus 
potentially stunting our society’s cultural growth. 
Second, the resulting inconsistencies between this court’s 
holding and the statutory language and case law threaten the 
uniform enforcement of copyright protection in the United 
States.  The court’s holding on “authorship” indicates that 
there are “right” and “wrong” kinds of authorship for 
copyright purposes, and that the human creator of an original 
work might not always be an author after all.  Additionally, 
the court’s problematic fixation standard and its reluctance to 
exemplify the scope of this standard add nothing but 
 
 139.  As an enumerated subject of copyright 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a)(4), see supra note 
46. 
 140.  Brief for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 11, Kelley, 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011) (No. 11-101). 
 141.  Kelley, 635 F.3d at 305. 
 142.  Brief for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
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unnecessary confusion to this already inconsistent opinion.  
Not only do these new rules leave artists, specifically those 
working with organic materials, in the dark as to the scope of 
potential copyright protection for their works, but they also 
challenge and harm the ability of legal advocates to advise 
and educate these artists in the area of copyright law.143 
CONCLUSION 
The relationship between law and culture is an 
interdependent one, characterized by cycles of definition, 
slippage, and redefinition.144  Our legal regime, and the 
Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause specifically, is 
meant to promote progress, and the copyright system is a key 
vehicle to both promoting and dictating this progress.145  As 
such, copyright is a powerful engine for stimulating and 
facilitating creative and artistic outlets, and in organizing the 
private cultural production and distribution of our artistic 
goods.146 
In recognition of this power, and in deference to the 
progressive goals of the Constitution, it is important for 
courts to refrain from using copyright to dictate or restrict our 
cultural progress in the name of promoting it.147  While 
contemporary art may pose many questions—or even perhaps 
concerns—about the artwork’s meaning or its level of artistic 
taste, the courts must not twist the statutory standards for 
basic copyrightability in an effort to prove a cultural point.  
The question “Is it art?” is not one to be determined in a court 
of law.  Such “judicial activism” in the art world is 
unwarranted and arguably harmful.  When the courts put 
aside notions of artistic taste and judgment, a proper 
copyright analysis can be applied to an artwork.  The courts 
must remain objective in their determination of 
copyrightability in order for cultural progression in the arts to 
remain uninhibited and forward-thinking. 
The present fate of Mr. Kelley and his Wildflower Works 
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exemplifies judicial activism wielded through the powerful 
copyright system.  The Seventh Circuit’s holding not only 
opens up a Pandora’s Box of copyright issues for those 
artworks which incorporate natural elements, but also greatly 
undermines the domains of such already nontraditional art.148  
We are fortunate to live in an era in which groundbreaking 
artistic developments happen daily.  However, it is precisely 
these innovative, and at times avant-garde, creations that are 
most in need of supportive legal practices and policies if they 
are to survive and contribute in our increasingly commercial 
and litigious society.149 
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